22 Dec 2025

M1/M2 legal enablement; A5 quicksands; a depolitized delivery way forward for remainder of current mandate and into next.

The M1 and M2 motorways in Northern Ireland were legally enabled primarily through the Special Roads Act (Northern Ireland) 1963, which provided the statutory authority for designating and constructing “special roads” (the legal term for motorways) restricted to certain classes of traffic, such as motorized vehicles only. This legislation mirrored the Special Roads Act 1949 in Great Britain but was tailored for Northern Ireland’s devolved system. It granted powers to the relevant authorities (initially the Ministry of Commerce, later evolving into the Department for Infrastructure) to plan, acquire land via compulsory purchase (vesting orders), design, and build these high-speed routes without the limitations applied to ordinary public roads, such as unrestricted access for pedestrians, cyclists, or animals. This facilitated efficient construction by allowing grade-separated junctions, controlled access, and streamlined planning processes to bypass some traditional road-building constraints.

Planning for motorways in Northern Ireland dated back to the 1930s and 1940s, with routes like the M1 (South Approach from Belfast to Portadown/Dungannon) and M2 (North Approach from Belfast northward) identified in post-WWII proposals. However, formal legal authority was lacking until 1963, so early work on the M1 proceeded under temporary powers. The first section of the M1 (from Donegall Road in Belfast to Saintfield Road in Lisburn) opened in July 1962, before the act’s passage, with subsequent sections completed through the 1960s under the new framework. The M2, starting construction in the early 1960s, benefited directly from the 1963 act, with its first section (Greencastle to Sandyknowes) opening in 1966.

Construction was further supported by administrative changes, such as the Roads Act (Northern Ireland) 1948, which centralized road authority under the Ministry of Commerce for major routes but did not specifically enable motorways—that role fell to the 1963 act. Projects involved public inquiries, route selections, and contracts awarded to firms like McAlpine, with challenges from bogs, bridges, and later the 1973 oil crisis and The Troubles delaying or abandoning expansions. The act’s provisions for land vesting and traffic restrictions were key to overcoming these hurdles and completing the core networks by the late 1960s/early 1970s.

Key differences to the A5

The key difference in the legal enactment and construction facilitation for Northern Ireland’s M1 and M2 motorways compared to the A5 (a major trunk/A-road linking Derry/Londonderry to Aughnacloy and onward to Dublin) lies in the type of road, the enabling legislation, and the planning/compulsory purchase processes involved.Motorways (M1/M2)

  • These are designated as “special roads” under the Special Roads Act (Northern Ireland) 1963, which specifically empowered the authorities (then the Ministry, now Department for Infrastructure) to create roads restricted to certain classes of traffic (primarily motor vehicles), with controlled access, grade-separated junctions, and no at-grade crossings for pedestrians, cyclists, or slow vehicles.
  • This act allowed streamlined planning, compulsory land acquisition (via vesting orders), and restrictions that bypassed many constraints of ordinary public roads.
  • It mirrored (but was separate from) Great Britain’s Special Roads Act 1949, adapted for NI’s devolved framework.
  • Early sections (e.g., M1 in 1962) proceeded under temporary/ad hoc powers before the 1963 act formalized the process, enabling rapid 1960s construction despite challenges like terrain and later disruptions.

A5 Upgrades

  • The A5 is a trunk road (non-motorway, all-purpose A-road), so it does not qualify for “special road” designation or the 1963 act’s motorway-specific powers.
  • Upgrades (primarily the proposed A5 Western Transport Corridor dual-carriageway scheme, announced in 2007) fall under general roads legislation, such as the Roads (Northern Ireland) Order 1993, involving public inquiries, environmental impact assessments, and vesting orders—but without the inherent restrictions and efficiencies tailored for motorways.
  • The project has faced repeated delays and legal challenges unrelated to the motorway act, including multiple judicial reviews on environmental grounds (most recently quashed in 2025 for non-compliance with the Climate Change Act (Northern Ireland) 2022, due to insufficient demonstration of alignment with carbon budgets and net-zero targets).
  • Unlike the M1/M2, which benefited from dedicated motorway-enabling law in a pre-climate-legislation era, the A5 scheme requires cross-departmental coordination on modern climate obligations, leading to higher scrutiny and hurdles.

In summary, the M1/M2 were facilitated by purpose-specific motorway legislation that explicitly enabled restricted-access high-speed roads, while the A5 relies on broader trunk road powers complicated by contemporary environmental and climate laws.

What should have happened to have A5 similar to the M1 and M2

The A5 Western Transport Corridor (dual-carriageway upgrade from Derry/Londonderry to Aughnacloy) should have followed a smoother, more decisive delivery path similar to the M1 and M2 motorways in the 1960s, with rapid progression from planning to construction once key enabling legislation and political commitment were in place.Similarities to M1/M2 Delivery

  • Strong central political/executive backing — Like the post-war push for the M1/M2 as essential economic and connectivity infrastructure, the A5 should have been treated as a flagship Executive priority from its 2007 announcement, with cross-party consensus overriding delays.
  • Dedicated enabling framework — The M1/M2 benefited from the Special Roads Act (Northern Ireland) 1963, which streamlined designation, land acquisition (vesting orders), and restricted-access construction. While the A5 (as a trunk dual-carriageway, not a full motorway) uses the broader Roads (Northern Ireland) Order 1993, it should have had expedited processes, perhaps via specific orders or emergency provisions to minimize public inquiries and challenges.
  • Phased construction with early starts — The M1 opened its first section in 1962 (pre-1963 Act, under ad hoc powers) and progressed quickly through the 1960s despite terrain challenges. The A5 should have started phased works (e.g., Strabane-Ballygawley section) promptly after 2024 approvals and Irish Government funding commitments, targeting completion by the late 2020s/early 2030s, rather than facing repeated halts.
  • Prioritization over objections — In the 1960s era, road safety and economic needs outweighed environmental or landowner concerns (pre-modern EIA requirements). The A5, with over 50 fatalities since 2006 and recognized as NI’s most dangerous road, should have been fast-tracked on safety grounds, with interim measures (e.g., average speed cameras, junction improvements) implemented immediately while full works proceeded.

Why It Didn’t Happen That WayUnlike the 1960s, the A5 has been hampered by:

  • Multiple judicial reviews (third successful challenge in June 2025 quashed approval for non-compliance with the Climate Change Act (Northern Ireland) 2022, citing insufficient evidence of alignment with net-zero 2050 targets and carbon budgets).
  • Modern regulatory hurdles (detailed environmental assessments, cross-departmental coordination with DAERA, habitats directives).
  • Funding fluctuations (though partially resolved with RoI contribution).

As of December 22, 2025, the project remains stalled pending an ongoing appeal against the June 2025 High Court ruling (heard around early December). In an ideal scenario mirroring the M1/M2, the A5 would now be under active construction on initial phases, with core sections open by now and the full route progressing unhindered. Instead, it exemplifies how contemporary climate, legal, and scrutiny frameworks—absent in the 1960s—have prolonged delivery despite urgent safety needs.

Who at fault for slow delivery of A5

The slow delivery of the A5 Western Transport Corridor dual-carriageway project (announced in 2007, with construction repeatedly delayed) stems from a combination of factors, with shared responsibility across multiple parties rather than a single entity being solely at fault. Here’s a balanced breakdown based on the project’s history up to December 2025:

Primary Recent Cause: Department for Infrastructure (DfI) and Executive Decisions

  • The most immediate delay arose from the June 2025 High Court ruling, which quashed approval for the project on grounds that DfI failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating compatibility with the Climate Change Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (requiring actions consistent with net-zero by 2050 and carbon budgets).
  • The judge described DfI’s approach as relying on “aspirational assumptions” rather than robust evidence, noting inadequate coordination with the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA) on climate impacts.
  • Critics (including opposition parties like the DUP and UUP in Assembly debates) accused DfI ministers (Sinn Féin-held portfolio at key decision points) of ignoring Planning Appeals Commission (PAC) recommendations, leaving the scheme “legally vulnerable” to challenge.
  • Historical “unforced errors” by the department—such as incomplete environmental assessments and procedural flaws—contributed to earlier quashings, handing ammunition to challengers.

Role of Challengers: Alternative A5 Alliance (AA5A)

  • The AA5A (a group of landowners, farmers, and residents) successfully brought the third judicial review in 2025, arguing environmental, climate, and human rights breaches (e.g., impacts on properties and failure to impose construction time limits).
  • While their actions directly halted progress, supporters view this as upholding legal standards rather than obstruction; opponents see it as prioritizing local/environmental concerns over urgent road safety needs (57+ deaths on the A5 since 2006).

Broader Systemic and Political Factors

  • Modern regulatory environment — Unlike the 1960s M1/M2 era (pre-climate laws and detailed EIAs), the A5 faces stringent requirements under the 2022 Climate Act, EU-derived habitats directives, and heightened judicial scrutiny. This has amplified delays, with the 2025 ruling highlighting tensions between infrastructure and net-zero obligations.
  • Political dynamics — Stormont’s restored Executive approved phased construction in October 2024 (under Sinn Féin Infrastructure Minister John O’Dowd), but cross-party blame persists: some accuse Sinn Féin of mishandling climate compliance; others blame the Act itself or broader Executive inaction on interim safety measures.
  • Funding and coordination issues — Fluctuations in Irish Government contributions and inter-departmental gaps (e.g., DfI-DAERA meetings yielding insufficient climate assurances) added hurdles.

Current Status (as of December 22, 2025)

  • DfI appealed the June 2025 ruling in August 2025.
  • The appeal process is ongoing, with hearings in December 2025 (parts remitted back to the original High Court judge for climate-related arguments; DAERA intervening in support).
  • No construction has started, and resolution could take months or years, potentially requiring revised assessments or scope changes.

In summary, the DfI bears significant responsibility for procedural shortcomings that enabled successful legal challenges, while the AA5A’s actions and post-2022 climate legislation have enforced accountability but prolonged delays. Many stakeholders (including road safety campaigners like “Enough is Enough”) argue the human cost of inaction outweighs these, calling for faster interim improvements or legislative tweaks to prioritize life-saving projects. The outcome of the ongoing appeal will clarify future fault lines.

Concept blame ?

The slow delivery of the A5 Western Transport Corridor dual-carriageway project (announced in 2007, with construction repeatedly delayed) stems from a combination of factors, with shared responsibility across multiple parties rather than a single entity being solely at fault. Here’s a balanced breakdown based on the project’s history up to December 2025:Primary Recent Cause: Department for Infrastructure (DfI) and Executive Decisions

  • The most immediate delay arose from the June 2025 High Court ruling, which quashed approval for the project on grounds that DfI failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating compatibility with the Climate Change Act (Northern Ireland) 2022 (requiring actions consistent with net-zero by 2050 and carbon budgets).
  • The judge described DfI’s approach as relying on “aspirational assumptions” rather than robust evidence, noting inadequate coordination with the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA) on climate impacts.
  • Critics (including opposition parties like the DUP and UUP in Assembly debates) accused DfI ministers (Sinn Féin-held portfolio at key decision points) of ignoring Planning Appeals Commission (PAC) recommendations, leaving the scheme “legally vulnerable” to challenge.
  • Historical “unforced errors” by the department—such as incomplete environmental assessments and procedural flaws—contributed to earlier quashings, handing ammunition to challengers.

Role of Challengers: Alternative A5 Alliance (AA5A)

  • The AA5A (a group of landowners, farmers, and residents) successfully brought the third judicial review in 2025, arguing environmental, climate, and human rights breaches (e.g., impacts on properties and failure to impose construction time limits).
  • While their actions directly halted progress, supporters view this as upholding legal standards rather than obstruction; opponents see it as prioritizing local/environmental concerns over urgent road safety needs (57+ deaths on the A5 since 2006).

Broader Systemic and Political Factors

  • Modern regulatory environment — Unlike the 1960s M1/M2 era (pre-climate laws and detailed EIAs), the A5 faces stringent requirements under the 2022 Climate Act, EU-derived habitats directives, and heightened judicial scrutiny. This has amplified delays, with the 2025 ruling highlighting tensions between infrastructure and net-zero obligations.
  • Political dynamics — Stormont’s restored Executive approved phased construction in October 2024 (under Sinn Féin Infrastructure Minister John O’Dowd), but cross-party blame persists: some accuse Sinn Féin of mishandling climate compliance; others blame the Act itself or broader Executive inaction on interim safety measures.
  • Funding and coordination issues — Fluctuations in Irish Government contributions and inter-departmental gaps (e.g., DfI-DAERA meetings yielding insufficient climate assurances) added hurdles.

Current Status (as of December 22, 2025)

  • DfI appealed the June 2025 ruling in August 2025.
  • The appeal process is ongoing, with hearings in December 2025 (parts remitted back to the original High Court judge for climate-related arguments; DAERA intervening in support).
  • No construction has started, and resolution could take months or years, potentially requiring revised assessments or scope changes.

In summary, the DfI bears significant responsibility for procedural shortcomings that enabled successful legal challenges, while the AA5A’s actions and post-2022 climate legislation have enforced accountability but prolonged delays. Many stakeholders (including road safety campaigners like “Enough is Enough”) argue the human cost of inaction outweighs these, calling for faster interim improvements or legislative tweaks to prioritize life-saving projects. The outcome of the ongoing appeal will clarify future fault lines.

Now , growth and new infrastructure seen as priority. How best can UK/NI facilitate this with respect for climate etc

To facilitate economic growth and new infrastructure development in the UK and Northern Ireland (NI) while respecting climate commitments (e.g., net zero by 2050 under the Climate Change Act 2008 for the UK and the Climate Change Act (Northern Ireland) 2022), a balanced, integrated approach is essential. Recent UK government strategies, such as the 10-Year Infrastructure Strategy (published June 2025) and the Carbon Budget and Growth Delivery Plan (October 2025), emphasize treating net zero as an opportunity for growth rather than a barrier, focusing on low-carbon technologies, resilient design, and cross-sector alignment.

This shift prioritizes infrastructure as a driver of productivity, with £13.2 billion allocated for initiatives like the Warm Homes Plan over the 2025 Spending Review period to accelerate decarbonization while boosting jobs and energy security.

In NI, where projects like the A5 Western Transport Corridor have been delayed by climate compliance issues (appeal hearings ongoing as of December 2025, with no final outcome yet), the focus should be on procedural improvements and innovation to avoid similar pitfalls.

Key Strategies for Facilitation

  1. Embed Climate Considerations Early in Planning:
    • Conduct comprehensive, evidence-based environmental and climate impact assessments from the outset, ensuring alignment with carbon budgets and sectoral targets under NI’s draft Climate Action Plan 2023-2027 and the UK’s Environmental Improvement Plan 2025. daera-ni.gov.uk +1 For NI projects, this means stronger inter-departmental collaboration (e.g., between DfI and DAERA) to provide “robust evidence” rather than assumptions, as highlighted in the June 2025 A5 High Court ruling.
    • Adopt a “net zero by design” principle, using tools like the UK’s Progress in Reducing Emissions 2025 report to benchmark projects against emission reduction pathways.
  2. Leverage Green Technologies and Funding:
    • Prioritize low-carbon materials (e.g., recycled aggregates, low-emission concrete) and sustainable construction methods in tenders, as promoted in the Autumn Budget 2025, which supports hydrogen, carbon capture, and clean energy as economic drivers. slaughterandmay.com In NI, integrate renewable energy into infrastructure (e.g., solar-powered lighting on roads) to offset emissions.
    • Access dedicated funding streams: The UK’s £13.2 billion Warm Homes Plan and multi-year spending reviews can co-fund NI projects via devolved allocations, while cross-border initiatives (e.g., Irish Government contributions to A5) align with shared climate goals. assets.publishing.service.gov.uk +1 Public-private partnerships, incentivized through tax relief for green investments, can accelerate delivery.
  3. Streamline Processes While Upholding Standards:
    • Implement phased delivery with interim safety measures (e.g., for A5: average speed cameras and junction upgrades during appeals) to maintain momentum without full halts, drawing from the UK’s 10-Year Strategy’s emphasis on addressing spatial trade-offs between infrastructure and land use.
    • Reform planning to reduce judicial review vulnerabilities: In NI, update the Roads (Northern Ireland) Order 1993 with climate-specific clauses, or use fast-track approvals for “critical” projects under the Climate Change Act 2022, ensuring public inquiries incorporate net zero evidence upfront. allirelandsustainability.com UK-wide, the National Infrastructure Strategy integrates adaptation measures (e.g., flood-resilient designs) to build long-term resilience.
  4. Foster Cross-Sector and Stakeholder Engagement:
    • Align with broader UK trends like renewable energy expansion and nuclear modernization, which create jobs while decarbonizing. infraspec.co.uk In NI, involve communities early (e.g., via consultations under the draft Climate Action Plan) to mitigate opposition from groups like the Alternative A5 Alliance.
    • Monitor and adapt: Use annual progress reports (e.g., CCC’s 2025 adaptation report) to iteratively refine projects, ensuring they contribute to emission reductions without compromising growth.

Potential Outcomes and Challenges

By adopting these methods, the UK/NI could deliver projects like the A5 more efficiently—potentially resolving the ongoing appeal (heard December 2025) through revised climate assurances—while achieving 2030 emission targets.

Challenges include political instability in NI and funding constraints, but the 2025 strategies signal a pivot toward viewing infrastructure as a net zero enabler, potentially unlocking £billions in investment and thousands of green jobs. If needed, legislative tweaks (e.g., clarifying compliance under NI’s 2022 Act) could further streamline this without diluting environmental protections.

Should infrastructure not be devolved to NI ?

No, infrastructure powers, including transport, should not be recentralized from Northern Ireland to Westminster. Devolution of these responsibilities—established under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 as a core element of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement—remains essential for political stability, local accountability, and tailored decision-making, despite frustrations with delays on projects like the A5 dual-carriageway.

Why Devolution Should Be Retained

  • Political and Constitutional Foundation: Transport and roads are fully devolved matters (except reserved areas like aviation and shipping). Recentralizing them would undermine the power-sharing model, which requires cross-community participation to manage NI’s divided society. The Agreement’s consociational design ensures unionists and nationalists share governance; removing key powers could erode trust and risk instability.
  • Local Responsiveness: Devolved control allows policies suited to NI’s unique needs, such as cross-border links (e.g., A5 connecting to Dublin), regional imbalances (east-west infrastructure divide), and integration with Republic of Ireland initiatives via the North-South Ministerial Council. Westminster oversight might prioritize GB-wide agendas over NI-specific issues like rural connectivity or safety on dangerous roads.
  • Democratic Accountability: The Department for Infrastructure (DfI) and Assembly enable direct scrutiny of decisions, funding, and priorities. Recent strategies (e.g., Rail Project Prioritisation Strategy 2025, DfI Mandate Plan 2025-27) show devolved institutions actively planning for growth, decarbonization, and connectivity.
  • Precedent and Resistance: Attempts to “encroach” on devolved transport powers (e.g., past UK proposals for bridges/tunnels) have faced strong pushback from NI and Scottish ministers, emphasizing the need for consultation to respect devolution settlements.

Addressing Delays and Challenges (e.g., A5)

Delays on major projects like the A5—stemming from judicial reviews, climate compliance issues under the Climate Change Act (Northern Ireland) 2022, inter-departmental coordination gaps, and political instability—are real problems, but they do not justify recentralization:

  • These reflect broader UK-wide tensions between infrastructure delivery and modern environmental/climate laws, not inherent flaws in devolution.
  • Solutions lie in reform within the devolved framework: stronger early climate evidence in appraisals, better DfI-DAERA coordination, phased delivery with interim safety measures, or targeted legislative tweaks to streamline approvals without diluting protections.
  • Historical underinvestment and east-west disparities predate full devolution; centralized direct rule periods (e.g., post-collapses) often saw even slower progress.

Potential Drawbacks of Recentralization

  • It could alienate communities, fuel grievances, and complicate cross-border cooperation essential for NI’s economy.
  • No mainstream political or expert consensus supports it; debates focus on improving devolved delivery (e.g., alternative funding models, pooled expertise) rather than reversal.

In summary, while NI’s infrastructure deficit and project delays highlight execution issues exacerbated by Stormont’s mandatory coalitions and regulatory hurdles, the benefits of devolved control—local tailoring, accountability, and peace process integrity—outweigh the case for recentralization. Improvements should focus on enhancing the existing system, aligning with UK-wide growth strategies while respecting NI’s distinct needs.

How ensure fast progress and no deliberate delays for political reasons and votes?

To ensure fast progress on infrastructure projects in Northern Ireland (NI) while minimizing deliberate delays driven by political motivations or electoral considerations, a multi-layered approach is needed. This draws on recent UK-wide reforms (e.g., the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, which received Royal Assent in December 2025 and applies elements to devolved contexts) and could be adapted to NI’s devolved framework under the Department for Infrastructure (DfI). The focus should be on legislative safeguards, independent oversight, transparent processes, and cross-party mechanisms to depoliticize delivery—balancing urgency with climate compliance and public accountability.

Key strategies include:

1. Legislative Reforms to Streamline Planning and Limit Challenges

  • Adopt Fast-Track Consenting Processes: Mirror the UK’s Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 by introducing NI-specific amendments to the Planning Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 or Roads (Northern Ireland) Order 1993. This could reduce legal challenges to a single judicial review opportunity (down from multiple), set statutory timelines for decisions (e.g., 6-12 months for major schemes), and classify critical projects (like the A5) as “nationally significant” with expedited approvals. The Act’s provisions for slashing bureaucratic delays in England/Wales could be devolved via Stormont, preventing endless appeals that often mask political stalling.
  • Incorporate Climate Safeguards Upfront: Mandate early, evidence-based climate assessments (aligned with the Climate Change Act (Northern Ireland) 2022) in project appraisals to avoid later quashings, as seen in the A5’s June 2025 High Court ruling. This depoliticizes environmental objections by making compliance non-negotiable from the start.

2. Independent Oversight and Depoliticization Mechanisms

  • Establish an Independent Infrastructure Commission for NI: Create or empower a body similar to the UK’s National Infrastructure Commission (with devolved input) to prioritize projects based on objective criteria (e.g., economic impact, safety, net-zero alignment) rather than party agendas. This could include mandatory cross-party reviews and public reporting on delays, holding ministers accountable without allowing vetoes for votes.
  • Ring-Fence Funding and Set Binding Milestones: Use multi-year budgets (e.g., via the UK Spending Review allocations to NI) to protect project funds from political horse-trading. Introduce legal penalties for unjustified delays, such as automatic escalation to Westminster if Stormont fails to meet timelines—though this should be a last resort to respect devolution.

3. Cross-Party and Stakeholder Commitments

  • Secure All-Party Agreements: Through the NI Executive or Assembly committees, require unanimous or supermajority support for flagship projects at inception, with “lock-in” clauses preventing mid-process withdrawals for electoral gain. Draw from the Republic of Ireland’s Accelerating Infrastructure Action Plan (December 2025), which includes judicial review reforms and efficiency measures that could inspire North-South cooperation on border projects like the A5.
  • Enhance Transparency and Public Engagement: Mandate regular progress audits and community consultations early on to build consensus, reducing the incentive for politicians to exploit delays for local votes. Tools like digital tracking platforms (as piloted in UK reforms) could expose any deliberate obstructions.

4. Interim Measures and Enforcement

  • Phased Delivery with Safety Nets: For ongoing projects, implement immediate interim upgrades (e.g., A5 speed cameras) while full works proceed, enforced via executive orders to bypass Assembly gridlock.
  • UK-Wide Alignment with Safeguards: Leverage UK strategies like the 10-Year Infrastructure Plan (updated 2025) for shared expertise and funding, but include clauses requiring NI consent to prevent perceived “interference” that could fuel political delays.

These steps could accelerate delivery by 20-50% based on UK projections, but success hinges on Stormont stability and willingness to enact reforms—potentially via a dedicated NI Infrastructure Acceleration Bill in 2026. While no system is immune to politics, this framework shifts emphasis to evidence and urgency, minimizing vote-driven sabotage.