STRANGFORD LOUGH CROSSING SURVEY RESULTS (Undertaken November 2024 – 458 Respondents)

Line-by-Line Analysis Cross-Referenced to Official Government Correspondence

Survey Date: 6 November 2024
Total Responses: 458
For: Ministerial Review
Cross-Referenced Documents: DfI Letters, Assembly Questions, Economic Data

SURVEY QUESTION 4: PRIMARY REASON FOR NOT USING CURRENT FERRY SERVICE

458 Responses

Survey Results:

• Reliability of service: 230 (50.2%) – HIGHEST
• Price of service: 212 (46.3%)
• Queues: 162 (35.4%)
• Delays: 153 (33.4%)
• Availability: 128 (27.9%)
• Overall time to queue and sail: 132 (28.8%)
• Timings of sailings: 137 (29.9%)

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

DfI Minister John O’Dowd (COR-1578-2024, 3 September 2024):

“The Strangford Lough Ferry Service operates every day of the year except Christmas day from early morning to late at night and serves both the local community and local tourism. It provides a reliable service…”

ANALYSIS: The Minister’s claim of “reliable service” is directly contradicted by survey data showing 50.2% of respondents cite reliability as their primary concern. This represents the single highest complaint category.

DfI 2023/24 Operational Data (from FOI documents):

• 108 sailings cancelled due to fog
• 32 cancelled due to staff unavailability
• 550 cancelled due to industrial action
• 158 cancelled due to mechanical/technical issues
• Total cancellations: 848 sailings in one year

EVIDENCE-BASED ASSESSMENT: The claim that the ferry “provides a reliable service” is unsustainable when nearly 850 sailings were cancelled in a single year, and industrial action alone cancelled 550 sailings.

Minister’s Assembly Response (AQW 27686/22-27, 10 June 2025):

“It provides a reliable service and is currently the most economical method of providing an effective transportation link…”

SURVEY vs. DEPARTMENTAL POSITION: Survey shows 46.3% cite price as primary concern, yet DfI claims it is “most economical.” The 2023/24 financial data shows:

• Operating costs: £3.52m
• Income: £1.43m
• Cost recovery: only 41%
• Annual taxpayer subsidy: £2.09m

FISCAL ANALYSIS: Over 30 years, taxpayers will subsidize ferry operations by approximately £70m, yet DfI refuses £100-200k feasibility study for permanent alternative.

SURVEY QUESTION 5: SATISFACTION WITH CURRENT FERRY SERVICE

458 Responses

Survey Results:

• Very dissatisfied: 29.9%
• Dissatisfied: 32.1%
• TOTAL DISSATISFIED: 62.0%
• Neutral: 19.2%
• Satisfied: 15.9%
• Very satisfied: 2.8%
• TOTAL SATISFIED: 18.7%

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

DfI 2009 Customer Care Survey (referenced in 2013 Strategic Review):

“Overall customers were very pleased with the service and singled out the crews for special thanks… 88.2% of all customers rated the reliability of the ferry service as good or very good.”

LONGITUDINAL COMPARISON: There has been a catastrophic deterioration in customer satisfaction from 2009 to 2024:

• 2009: 88.2% rated reliability as “good or very good”
• 2024: 62.0% dissatisfied with overall service
• Net satisfaction decline: approximately 70 percentage points

POLICY EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT: This represents a fundamental failure of the 2013 Strategic Review’s recommendation to maintain status quo.

Community Support Finding (SLC Final Survey Results Summary):

“94% of survey respondents indicating current service is not fit for purpose”

DATA RECONCILIATION: When dissatisfied (62%) + neutral (19.2%) are combined, 81.2% are not positively satisfied with the service. The “fit for purpose” question shows even starker rejection at 94%.

DfI Position (Multiple responses 2024-2025):

“The ferry provides a reliable service”

CONCLUSION: This repeated assertion is empirically false according to the community it serves.

SURVEY QUESTION 6: MOST PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF FERRY SERVICE (Multiple Selection)

458 Responses

Survey Results:

• Weather related cancellations: 317 (69.2%) – HIGHEST
• Mechanical/Electrical reliability: 325 (71.0%) – HIGHEST
• Cost: 260 (56.8%)
• Operation hours: 204 (44.5%)
• Capacity limitations: 192 (41.9%)
• Wait times: 180 (39.3%)
• Frequency of service: 132 (28.8%)

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

Weather Cancellations (69.2% concern):

2013 Strategic Review Report – Appendix 3: Fog cancellations documented as recurring issue

2023/24 Data:

• 108 fog cancellations

SYSTEMIC ISSUE IDENTIFICATION: Weather vulnerability has been known issue since at least 2013 with no solution implemented. A permanent crossing would eliminate this vulnerability entirely, providing 24/7 all-weather access.

Mechanical/Electrical Reliability (71.0% concern – HIGHEST):

2023/24 Data:

• 158 cancellations due to mechanical/technical issues

2013 Strategic Review Cost Data:

• MV Portaferry II: 2003 refurbishment cost £1.8m
• MV Strangford I: Built 1969, scrap value nil by 2013

ASSET MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT: The fleet is aging and unreliable. The 2013 review noted MV Strangford I had nil scrap value even then. Continued investment in aging diesel ferry fleet while refusing to study permanent alternative represents poor asset management.

Operating Hours (44.5% concern):

Current service:

• First sailing Portaferry: 07:45
• Last sailing: 22:30
• No service 22:30-07:45 (9 hours 15 minutes nightly isolation)

Survey Comment (Healthcare Access):

“If you take a heart attack after 2200 at night you are faced with at least a 30 min drive to the nearest hospital.”

CRITICAL SERVICE GAP: The lack of 24/7 access creates a critical healthcare access gap. Direct crossing: 7 miles to Downe Hospital. Alternative route after 22:30: 75km/1.5 hours. This represents a life-threatening service gap that DfI’s “reliable service” claim ignores.

Cost (56.8% concern):

DfI Financial Data 2023/24:

• Ferry income: £1.43m
• Operating costs: £3.52m
• Subsidy: £2.09m annually
• Cost per crossing (subsidy component): approximately £2.35 per vehicle based on 888,000 annual crossings

2016/17 Comparison:

• Operating costs: £2.49m
• 2023/24: £3.52m
• Increase: 41% over 7 years

FINANCIAL TRAJECTORY ANALYSIS: While users pay fares, taxpayers subsidize 59% of operational costs. The 41% cost increase over 7 years demonstrates unsustainable operational trajectory. Yet DfI refuses to study permanent alternative that would eliminate ongoing subsidy requirement.

SURVEY QUESTION 7: PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE CROSSING TYPE

458 Responses

Survey Results:

• Bridge: 415 (90.6%) – OVERWHELMING PREFERENCE
• Tunnel: 147 (32.1%)
• Improved ferry boat/service: 86 (18.8%)

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

DfI Minister Response (COR-1578-2024, 3 September 2024):

“I agree that a permanent crossing would improve journey times compared to the current ferry service but regrettably it is considered that there would currently be insufficient economic benefits to justify such a major investment.”

COMMUNITY PREFERENCE vs. POLICY: 90.6% community preference for bridge, yet DfI refuses even a feasibility study. The Minister acknowledges improved journey times but dismisses without evidence-based assessment.

POLICY-COMMUNITY DISCONNECT: Only 18.8% prefer improved ferry, yet this is DfI’s default position despite:

• 62% dissatisfaction
• 94% believe service “not fit for purpose”
• £70m projected 30-year subsidy cost

Department of Economy Response (INV-0248-2025, 8 March 2025 – Minister Archibald):

“While we recognise that any improved infrastructure has the potential to benefit the economy, this is a matter for the Department for Infrastructure (DfI). Officials have engaged with DfI, who have advised there would currently be insufficient economic benefits…”

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION ISSUE: Economy Minister defers to DfI, yet Ards & North Down has:

• Lowest median wages in NI: £450.10 weekly (Source: Sub-Regional Economic Plan)
• Second-lowest productivity
• Employment rate only 73.6% (below NI average)

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT: Cross-departmental analysis shows clear economic development need, yet both departments deflect responsibility.

SURVEY QUESTION 8: TIME SAVINGS ESTIMATE

458 Responses

Survey Results:

• More than 30 minutes: 188 (41%) – PLURALITY
• 20 to 30 minutes: 122 (26.6%)
• 10 to 20 minutes: 108 (23.6%)
• Less than 10 minutes: 55 (12%)
• 60 minutes: 2 (0.4%)

Combined 20+ minutes: 310 (67.6%) Combined 30+ minutes: 188 (41%)

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

Current Journey Times:

• Direct crossing (ferry): ~10 minutes sail + queue time
• Alternative route (when ferry unavailable): 75km via Belfast/Downpatrick = 1.5 hours minimum

Survey respondent comment:

“Journey time to hospital: 7 miles direct via ferry, Over 75km/1.5 hours by road alternative”

Bridge Crossing Time: Estimated 8 minutes

USER EXPERIENCE DATA: The 41% estimating “more than 30 minutes” savings likely reflects:

1. Ferry queue times (especially summer/peak)
2. Comparison to road alternative when ferry unavailable
3. Elimination of ferry scheduling constraints

MISSING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: DfI refuses to quantify these journey time savings in formal economic assessment despite clear community experience of significant time costs.

Letter to DfI (KTB-reply-2024, 30 September 2024) – Point 2:

“Quality of Life Improvements: A permanent crossing would significantly enhance the quality of life for local residents. Reduced travel times and increased access to services, education, and employment opportunities would have a profound impact on the community’s well-being and productivity.”

DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSE GAP: DfI has not responded substantively to this quality-of-life argument. Journey time savings have economic value through:

• Increased labor market access
• Improved emergency service response
• Enhanced productivity
• Better healthcare access

APPRAISAL METHODOLOGY GAP: Standard DfT WebTAG methodology values time savings. DfI refuses to apply this analysis.

SURVEY QUESTION 9: WILLINGNESS TO PAY TOLL

458 Responses

Survey Results:

• Yes: 374 (81.7%) – OVERWHELMING SUPPORT
• Maybe: 56 (12.2%)
• No: 28 (6.1%)

Combined Yes/Maybe: 430 (93.9%)

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

FUNDING VIABILITY INDICATOR: This is perhaps the most significant survey finding for funding viability.

Investment Opportunity Analysis (from project documents):

• Project value: £300-400M
• Innovative funding structure: Public-private partnership + National Wealth Fund + Shared Island Fund
• Revenue streams: Toll income, development contributions, property value capture
• Target leverage ratio: 1:3 public-private
• BCR projections: 3.1:1 to 8.5:1

REVENUE CERTAINTY INDICATOR: 81.7% willing to pay toll demonstrates:

1. Revenue certainty for private finance
2. User acceptance of cost-recovery model
3. Demand confidence exceeding ferry baseline

DfI Position (Multiple responses):

“Insufficient economic benefits”

CIRCULAR LOGIC IDENTIFIED: DfI’s economic assessment completely ignores toll revenue potential. An 81.7% willingness-to-pay rate on projected traffic volumes (Year 1: 886K crossings; Year 30: 2.1M-6.9M) represents substantial revenue stream that could:

• Service private finance debt
• Reduce public sector funding requirement
• Deliver positive BCR

ANALYTICAL VOID: DfI’s refusal to commission feasibility study prevents formal revenue modeling, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy of “insufficient economic justification.”

SURVEY QUESTION 10: MAXIMUM TOLL WILLINGNESS

458 Responses (conditional on Q9=Yes)

Survey Results:

• £1 to £3: 341 (74.5%) – VAST MAJORITY
• £4 to £6: 123 (26.9%)
• £7 to £9: 14 (3.1%)
• £10 or more: 12 (2.6%)

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

REVENUE MODELING PARAMETERS: 74.5% willing to pay £1-3 per crossing provides concrete revenue modeling parameters.

Revenue Modeling (Based on Survey + Traffic Projections):

Conservative Scenario (£2 toll, Year 1: 886K crossings):

• Annual toll revenue: £1.772m
• 30-year revenue (no growth): £53.16m

Moderate Growth Scenario (£2.50 toll, Year 30: 2.1M crossings):

• Year 30 annual revenue: £5.25m
• Cumulative 30-year (with growth curve): £80-100m

COMPARATIVE FISCAL ANALYSIS: These revenue projections, combined with:

• Shared Island Fund (50%+ of capital): £150-200m
• Private finance leveraged by toll revenue
• Development value capture

…demonstrate feasible funding structure that DfI refuses to analyze.

Current Ferry Economics:

• 30-year taxpayer subsidy: £70m (£2.09m × 30 years + capital)
• No revenue generation
• Escalating operational costs (+41% since 2016/17)

Bridge Economics:

• 30-year toll revenue: £80-100m (moderate scenario)
• Reduced public sector burden through PPP
• Taxpayer savings: £50-70m over ferry alternative

DfI’s Position:

“Taking forward a feasibility study is not considered a good use of public funding particularly during a time when the Department is facing significant funding and resource challenges.”

VALUE FOR MONEY PARADOX: Refusing a £100-200k feasibility study while committing to £70m in ferry subsidies represents perverse financial logic. The feasibility study cost is 0.14-0.29% of projected ferry subsidy costs.

SURVEY QUESTION 11: IMPACT ON LOCAL ECONOMY

458 Responses

Survey Results:

• Very positively: 370 (80.8%) – OVERWHELMING
• Somewhat positively: 61 (13.3%)
• TOTAL POSITIVE: 431 (94.1%)
• No impact: 10 (2.2%)
• Somewhat negatively: 15 (3.3%)
• Very negatively: 8 (1.7%)

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

DfI Minister (COR-1578-2024):

“Regrettably it is considered that there would currently be insufficient economic benefits to justify such a major investment.”

COMMUNITY vs. DEPARTMENTAL ASSESSMENT: 94.1% of community believes economic impact would be positive, yet DfI concludes “insufficient economic benefits” without commissioning economic impact assessment.

Ards & North Down Economic Context (Sub-Regional Economic Plan – Technical Annex):

• Median weekly wage: £450.10 (LOWEST in NI, vs NI average £528.90)
• Export intensity: 13% (LOWEST in NI, vs NI average 17%)
• Employment rate: 73.6% (below NI average)
• Productivity: Second-lowest in NI

Investment Opportunity Analysis Projects:

• Job creation: 10,000-18,000 (30% scenario)
  • Construction: 400-600
  • Tourism: 800-1,200
  • Mainland employment access: 2,000-3,500
  • Business development: 600-900
  • Healthcare: 300-500
  • Residential: 350-550

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT: The region with lowest wages and second-lowest productivity in NI could benefit most from connectivity infrastructure, yet DfI dismisses economic case without analysis.

Department of Economy Position (INV-0248-2025):

“While we recognise that any improved infrastructure has the potential to benefit the economy, this is a matter for the Department for Infrastructure”

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY GAP: Economy Minister acknowledges economic benefits but defers to DfI. Neither department has commissioned economic impact study despite clear regional economic need.

Letter from Kevin Barry (KTB-reply-2024, Point 7):

“Broader Regional Impact: The benefits of improved connectivity extend beyond the immediate vicinity of Strangford Lough. The entire region stands to gain from increased accessibility, potentially attracting new residents and businesses, and stimulating economic growth across a wider area.”

POLICY RESPONSE: No substantive engagement with broader economic development argument.

SURVEY QUESTION 12: WOULD YOU MISS THE FERRY?

458 Responses

Survey Results:

• No: 280 (61.1%) – CLEAR MAJORITY
• Yes: 53 (11.6%)
• Not sure: 27 (5.9%)

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

CULTURAL vs. FUNCTIONAL VALUE: 61.1% would NOT miss the ferry – this is remarkable given ferry’s iconic status and tourism attraction claims.

DfI Position (Multiple responses):

“The Strangford Lough Ferry Service… serves both the local community and local tourism.”

Tourism Counter-Argument (Survey Comments):

“There would be no detriment to tourism in the area if the ferry service ceased to operate.” “A bridge is the best solution and would be a new tourist attraction.”

TOURISM VALUE REASSESSMENT: Only 11.6% would miss the ferry, suggesting tourism value is overstated by DfI. Modern bridge could itself be tourist attraction (precedent: Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy Bridge, County Wexford).

Letter from Kevin Barry (Point 12):

“Strategic Importance: We urge you to consider this crossing as a strategic infrastructure project that aligns with broader national and regional development goals.”

COMMUNITY PRIORITY SHIFT: Community has moved beyond sentiment to pragmatic infrastructure need. The 61.1% willing to lose ferry demonstrates prioritization of functionality over tradition.

SURVEY QUESTION 13: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CONCERN

458 Responses

Survey Results:

• Not at all concerned: 26.9%
• Not very concerned: 20.5%
• TOTAL NOT CONCERNED: 47.4%
• Neutral: 31%
• Somewhat concerned: 14%
• Very concerned: 7.6%
• TOTAL CONCERNED: 21.6%

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

DfI Minister (COR-1578-2024):

“Such a project would require very significant capital investment in a very sensitive environment as Strangford Lough is designated as a Special Area of Conservation and an Area of Special Scientific Interest.”

STAKEHOLDER ACCEPTANCE: DfI emphasizes environmental sensitivity, yet 47.4% of community NOT concerned and only 21.6% concerned about environmental impact.

Survey Comments (Environmental Considerations – 20% of comments):

Benefits cited:

• Reduced emissions vs current ferry
• Potential for renewable energy integration
• Elimination of queuing vehicle emissions
• More efficient transport routing

Concerns cited:

• Visual impact of potential bridge
• Construction environmental impact
• Impact on marine traffic

Letter from Kevin Barry (Point 3):

“Environmental Considerations: Contrary to initial perceptions, a permanent crossing could potentially be more environmentally friendly than the current ferry service. It would reduce emissions from idling vehicles waiting for the ferry and eliminate the need for the ferry itself, potentially lowering the overall carbon footprint of cross-lough travel.”

INCOMPLETE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: DfI uses environmental designation as de facto veto without assessing:

1. Current ferry environmental impact (diesel emissions, ongoing operations)
2. Modern bridge engineering capabilities (Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy Bridge precedent in environmentally sensitive area)
3. Net environmental benefit of eliminating ferry + queuing vehicle emissions

Climate Action Context:

• Northern Ireland 2050 net zero commitment
• Ongoing diesel ferry operations incompatible with decarbonization
• Bridge could integrate renewable energy, EV charging, active travel

PROPORTIONALITY QUESTION: DfI’s environmental objection appears disproportionate given community acceptance and modern engineering capabilities.

SURVEY QUESTION 14: QUALITY OF LIFE IMPROVEMENT

458 Responses

Survey Results:

• Significantly improve: 278 (60.7%) – STRONG MAJORITY
• Somewhat improve: 121 (26.4%)
• TOTAL POSITIVE: 399 (87.1%)
• No change: 49 (10.7%)
• Somewhat worsen: 2 (0.4%)
• Significantly worsen: 0 (0%)

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

PRIMARY COMMUNITY BENEFIT: 87.1% expect quality of life improvement – this is the core community benefit that DfI’s economic-only analysis ignores.

DfI Economic Justification Focus:

“There would currently be insufficient economic benefits to justify such a major investment.”

Letter from Kevin Barry (Point 2 – Quality of Life):

“A permanent crossing would significantly enhance the quality of life for local residents. Reduced travel times and increased access to services, education, and employment opportunities would have a profound impact on the community’s well-being and productivity.”

Survey Comments Summary (from SLC Final Survey Results):

Healthcare & Emergency Access (30% of comments):

• No emergency access 22:30-07:45 (9+ hours nightly)
• 7 miles direct vs 75km alternative route
• “If you take a heart attack after 2200 at night you are faced with at least a 30 min drive to the nearest hospital”

Education & Social Impact (25% of comments):

• Students facing extended journey times
• Service disruption affecting school attendance
• Limited after-school activities access
• Social isolation from early service end (22:30)
• Employment/education opportunity constraints

APPRAISAL METHODOLOGY DEFICIENCY: Standard infrastructure appraisal methodology (WebTAG) includes social value alongside economic benefits. Quality of life improvements have quantifiable economic value through:

• Health outcomes (healthcare access)
• Educational attainment (school attendance)
• Labor market participation (employment access)
• Community cohesion

ANALYTICAL GAP: DfI refuses to apply comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that would capture these values.

Assembly Question Response (AQW 30608/22-27, 23 September 2025):

“Consideration of the need for a detailed assessment of the bridge between Portaferry and Strangford will be informed by the outcome of the Eastern Transport Plan.”

BUREAUCRATIC DEFERRAL vs. COMMUNITY EVIDENCE: DfI defers decision to ETP process (timeline uncertain, phased approach), while 87.1% of community has clear view that quality of life would improve. Community assessment based on lived experience; DfI awaits bureaucratic process.

SURVEY QUESTION 15: TRAVEL BEHAVIOR CHANGE

458 Responses

Survey Results:

• I would travel to the other side much more often: 359 (78.4%) – OVERWHELMING
• I would travel to the other side somewhat more often: 60 (13.1%)
• TOTAL INCREASED TRAVEL: 419 (91.5%)
• No change in my travel habits: 36 (7.9%)
• I would travel to the other side less often: 3 (0.7%)

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

SUPPRESSED DEMAND EVIDENCE: This is critical evidence of suppressed demand that DfI’s traffic modeling ignores.

91.5% would increase cross-lough travel if permanent crossing available. This demonstrates:

1. Current ferry constrains movement
2. Latent demand far exceeds current ferry usage
3. Traffic projections based on ferry baseline are fundamentally flawed

Current Ferry Usage (2023/24):

• Approximately 888,000 crossings annually
• Operates at only 34% of maximum capacity (documented in project files)

Investment Opportunity Traffic Projections:

• Year 1: 886,000 crossings
• Year 30: 2.1M – 6.9M crossings
• Growth factor: 8.9× to 29.0× ferry baseline

Cleddau Bridge Precedent (Wales): Referenced in project documents as empirical evidence of suppressed demand release when permanent crossing replaces ferry service. Traffic volumes substantially exceeded pre-bridge ferry baseline.

SURVEY VALIDATION OF PROJECTIONS: 91.5% increased travel intention provides survey validation of traffic growth projections. Yet DfI dismisses economic case without modeling this latent demand.

DfI Position:

“At this time my Department would not have the economic justification to begin to explore a permanent bridge connection”

FUNDAMENTAL METHODOLOGY FLAW: How can DfI assess “economic justification” without:

1. Modeling latent demand (91.5% would increase travel)
2. Quantifying journey time savings (67.6% estimate 20+ minutes)
3. Assessing toll revenue potential (81.7% willing to pay)
4. Analyzing quality of life benefits (87.1% expect improvement)
5. Evaluating regional economic development (94.1% expect positive economic impact)

SELF-PERPETUATING BARRIER: DfI refuses feasibility study that would establish these parameters.

SURVEY QUESTION 16: MOST IMPORTANT BENEFITS (Ranked)

458 Responses

Survey Results (Top Ranking – Position 1):

• Improved reliability (24hrs): ~200 respondents (Rank 1)
• Reduced travel time: ~180 respondents (Rank 1)
• Better access to services (Healthcare, Education): ~150 respondents (Rank 1)
• Economic growth in the region: ~120 respondents (Rank 1)
• Increased tourism: ~110 respondents (Rank 1)

Cross-Reference to Official Position:

COMMUNITY PRIORITY HIERARCHY: Community priorities are clear:

1. 24/7 reliability (what ferry cannot provide)
2. Time savings (quantifiable economic benefit)
3. Healthcare/Education access (social value)
4. Economic growth (regional development)
5. Tourism (DfI’s claimed ferry benefit)

DfI’s Focus:

“The Strangford Lough Ferry Service… serves both the local community and local tourism.”

POLICY-COMMUNITY MISALIGNMENT: DfI emphasizes ferry’s tourism function, yet community ranks tourism FIFTH in importance, after:

• Reliability
• Time savings
• Healthcare/education access
• Economic growth

This reveals fundamental disconnect between:

• DfI perspective: Ferry as tourist attraction
• Community perspective: Crossing as essential infrastructure for daily life

Current Ferry Limitations vs. Community Priorities:

Letter from Kevin Barry (Point 8):

“Comprehensive Cost-Benefit Analysis: We respectfully request a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that considers not just immediate economic returns, but also social, environmental, and long-term economic factors.”

MISSING WEIGHTING METHODOLOGY: Survey Question 16 provides community weighting for CBA factors. DfI refuses to commission the CBA that would quantify these community-prioritized benefits.

SURVEY QUESTION 17: COMMENTS

Separate detailed section – 458 comments analyzed

Key Themes from Comment Analysis (SLC Final Survey Results Summary):

1. Service Reliability & Operating Hours (40% of comments):

• Service ends 22:30 = overnight isolation
• First sailing 07:45 too late for workers
• Frequent cancellations (weather, mechanical, staff, strikes)

2. Economic & Business Impact (35% of comments):

• Lost trade from service interruptions
• Limited evening hours affecting hospitality
• Additional commuter costs
• Reduced tourism potential
• Lost investment opportunities

3. Healthcare & Emergency Access (30% of comments):

• No emergency route 22:30-07:45
• 7 miles vs 75km/1.5 hours alternative
• Emergency response time concerns
• Medical appointment difficulties
• Elderly/vulnerable particularly affected

4. Education & Social Impact (25% of comments):

• Extended student journey times
• School attendance disruption
• Limited after-school activities
• Family connections across lough
• Social isolation
• Employment/education constraints

5. Environmental & Infrastructure (20% of comments):

• Mixed Views Documented
• Concerns: Visual impact, construction impact, marine traffic
• Benefits: Reduced emissions vs ferry, renewable energy potential, elimination of queuing emissions

6. Cost & Value for Money (15% of comments):

• High ferry fares for regular users
• Additional fuel costs from alternative route
• Time costs from queuing/delays
• Economic inefficiency of current service
• Willingness to pay tolls for reliable 24/7 access
• Support for local resident discount schemes

CROSS-REFERENCE TO 2013 STRATEGIC REVIEW

2013 Strategic Review Comparison:

The SLC Comments Summary notes:

“The 2013 Strategic Review Report identified similar issues, suggesting:

1. Little progress on addressing core community needs
2. Worsening service reliability
3. Increasing capacity constraints
4. Growing economic impact”

DECADE OF DECLINE:

2013 Review Findings:

• Customer satisfaction: High (88.2% rated reliability good/very good)
• 2009 survey: “customers were very pleased with the service”
• Common complaint: First weekday sailing from Portaferry often full

2024 Survey Findings:

• Customer satisfaction: Low (62% dissatisfied)
• Service “not fit for purpose”: 94%
• Multiple systemic complaints: reliability (50.2%), price (46.3%), mechanical issues (71%), weather (69.2%)

OPERATIONAL COSTS TRAJECTORY:

• 2016/17: £2.49m
• 2023/24: £3.52m
• Increase: 41% over 7 years
• **Reliability: Worse (850 cancellations in 2023/24)**

2013 STRATEGIC REVIEW RECOMMENDED OPTIONS:

The 2013 Review (Appendix 5) examined:

1. PPP/PFI: Rejected – Minister (John Spellar) viewed as not appropriate; previous failed PFI attempt; long and costly process
2. Management Contract: Recommended – Would address key issues, provide marine expertise
3. Status Quo: Problems identified – Ferry Service “did not fit well into Roads Service”; dependent on external professional advice
4. Labour Only Contract: Rejected – Did not address need for external expertise; earlier contract resulted in significant cost increases

OUTCOME ASSESSMENT: The 2013 Review recommended Management Contract as optimal solution. However, Status Quo appears to have been maintained with deteriorating results:

• Cost increased 41% (2016/17 to 2023/24)
• Satisfaction declined ~70 percentage points (2009 to 2024)
• Reliability worsened (850 cancellations in 2023/24)
• Industrial action: 550 cancelled sailings in one year

POLICY FAILURE INDICATORS: The 2013 recommendation was not implemented, and the maintained status quo has demonstrably failed to address community needs over the subsequent decade.

SURVEY QUESTION 18: AGE GROUPING

458 Responses

Survey Results:

• Aged 40-59: 192 (41.9%) – PLURALITY
• Aged 18-39: 159 (34.7%)
• Aged 60-79: 61 (13.3%)
• Aged 11-17: 46 (10%)

Combined Working Age (18-59): 351 (76.6%)

Analysis:

DEMOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION:

• Survey predominantly represents working-age population (76.6%)
• This aligns with survey themes prioritizing:
  • Employment access
  • Commuting reliability
  • School/education concerns
  • Healthcare access during working years

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY CORRELATION: The survey’s demographic profile matches the economically active population most affected by ferry constraints:

• Daily commuters to work
• Parents with school-age children
• Business owners/operators
• Healthcare service users

POLICY IMPLICATION: The survey captures views of the demographic most impacted by connectivity constraints and most likely to utilize alternative crossing for economic/social purposes (not primarily tourism).

AGGREGATE SURVEY FINDINGS: SUMMARY TABLE

CRITICAL EVIDENCE GAPS IN DEPARTMENTAL ASSESSMENT

Based on survey evidence, the following analytical gaps exist in DfI’s position:

1. DEMAND MODELING GAP

Survey Evidence:

• 91.5% would increase travel frequency
• Current ferry operates at 34% capacity
• Queue times cited by 35.4%

DfI Assessment: Based on current ferry usage (888K annual crossings)

Missing Analysis:

• Suppressed demand modeling
• Latent demand quantification
• Traffic growth scenarios beyond ferry baseline
• Comparison to Cleddau Bridge empirical data

Consequence: Economic case systematically underestimates potential crossing utilization

2. REVENUE MODELING GAP

Survey Evidence:

• 81.7% willing to pay toll
• 74.5% willing to pay £1-3
• Toll revenue: £1.8m (Year 1, £2 toll) to £5.25m (Year 30, £2.50 toll)

DfI Assessment: “Insufficient economic benefits”

Missing Analysis:

• Toll revenue projections
• Cost recovery modeling
• Private finance viability assessment
• Comparative analysis: toll revenue vs. ferry subsidy

Consequence: Funding structure options not explored, creating false “unaffordable” conclusion

3. JOURNEY TIME BENEFITS GAP

Survey Evidence:

• 67.6% estimate 20+ minute savings
• 41% estimate 30+ minute savings
• Healthcare emergency access: 7 miles vs 75km alternative

DfI Assessment: Minister acknowledges “improved journey times” but not quantified

Missing Analysis:

• WebTAG journey time valuation
• Productivity benefits from time savings
• Emergency service response improvements
• Healthcare access time valuation
• Educational attendance improvements

Consequence: Major benefit stream excluded from economic case

4. QUALITY OF LIFE / SOCIAL VALUE GAP

Survey Evidence:

• 87.1% expect quality of life improvement
• Healthcare access priority (ranked 3rd)
• Education access impacts documented
• Social isolation concerns (22:30 service end)

DfI Assessment: Not addressed in economic justification

Missing Analysis:

• Social value monetization (per WebTAG guidance)
• Health outcome improvements
• Educational attainment effects
• Community cohesion benefits
• Wellbeing valuation

Consequence: Non-market benefits entirely excluded from assessment

5. REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GAP

Survey Evidence:

• 94.1% expect positive economic impact
• Business impact comments (35% of all comments)
• Employment opportunity concerns

DfI Assessment: “Insufficient economic benefits”

Missing Analysis:

• Agglomeration benefits
• Labor market expansion effects
• Business productivity improvements
• Tourism sector growth potential
• Property value uplift
• Wider economic impacts (per WebTAG guidance)

Economic Context Ignored:

• Ards & North Down: Lowest median wages (£450.10 vs £528.90 NI average)
• Second-lowest productivity
• Lowest export intensity (13% vs 17% NI average)

Consequence: Region with greatest need for connectivity infrastructure assessed as having “insufficient benefits”

6. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT GAP

Survey Evidence:

• 62% dissatisfied with ferry
• 50.2% cite reliability problems
• 71% cite mechanical issues
• Only 18.8% prefer improved ferry

DfI Assessment: Ferry is “most economical method”

Missing Analysis:

• 30-year whole-life cost comparison
  • Ferry: £70m taxpayer subsidy + escalating operational costs
  • Bridge: £300-400m capital – £150-200m Shared Island Fund – £80-100m toll revenue = net public cost
• Risk-adjusted comparison
• Asset life comparison (aging ferry fleet vs. 120-year bridge life)
• Reliability comparison
• Capacity comparison

Consequence: “Most economical” claim not evidenced by comparative whole-life analysis

7. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT GAP

Survey Evidence:

• 47.4% not concerned about environmental impact
• Only 21.6% concerned
• Comments cite potential environmental benefits of bridge

DfI Assessment: Environmental designation (SAC/ASSI) cited as significant barrier

Missing Analysis:

• Comparative environmental impact: ongoing ferry operations vs. bridge construction + operation
• Carbon emissions: diesel ferry + queuing vehicles vs. bridge
• Net environmental benefit assessment
• Modern engineering environmental mitigation capabilities
• Renewable energy integration potential in bridge design
• Active travel provision benefits

Consequence: Environmental designation used as de facto veto without comparative assessment or mitigation analysis

8. FUNDING OPTIONS GAP

Survey Evidence:

• 81.7% toll acceptance
• 74.5% willing to pay £1-3
• Community support for PPP models with local discounts

DfI Assessment: “Not considered a good use of public funding”

Missing Analysis:

• Public-Private Partnership structures
• Shared Island Fund application (50%+ capital available)
• National Wealth Fund cornerstone investment potential
• Development value capture mechanisms
• Tax Increment Financing options
• Phased delivery options
• Risk allocation frameworks

Consequence: Full public sector funding assumed, ignoring substantial external funding sources and risk-sharing mechanisms

9. STAKEHOLDER ACCEPTANCE GAP

Survey Evidence:

• 458 responses
• 94% believe service “not fit for purpose”
• 90.6% prefer bridge
• Cross-party political support (DUP, Sinn Féin, Alliance, SDLP)

DfI Assessment: No formal stakeholder consultation or acceptance assessment documented

Missing Analysis:

• Formal public consultation process
• Stakeholder mapping and engagement
• Cross-community support assessment
• Political consensus documentation
• Business community engagement
• Tourism sector views

Consequence: Decision-making disconnected from stakeholder evidence and unprecedented cross-community consensus

10. STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT GAP

Survey Evidence:

• Community priorities align with government strategies:
  • Economic development (94.1% expect positive impact)
  • Regional balance (Ards & North Down lowest wages/productivity)
  • Climate action (decarbonization vs. diesel ferry)
  • Healthcare access (87.1% quality of life improvement)

DfI Assessment: Project not aligned with departmental priorities

Missing Analysis:

• Transport Strategy 2035 strategic fit
• Eastern Transport Plan alignment
• Regional Strategic Transport Network continuity (A2 coastal route completion)
• Programme for Government outcomes alignment
• Economic strategy contribution
• Climate Change Act compliance
• Shared Island Initiative fit

Policy Documents:

• Transport Strategy 2035: Consultation completed September 2025, SLC not referenced
• Eastern Transport Plan 2035: “Too early to provide list of schemes”
• RSTNTP: To be published Spring 2025 (timeline from September 2024 correspondence)

Consequence: Strategic infrastructure project excluded from strategic planning processes without formal assessment

COMPARISON: 2009 vs 2024 CUSTOMER SATISFACTION

15-YEAR TRAJECTORY: From satisfied customer base (2009) to failed service designation by community (2024: 94% “not fit for purpose”)

2013 STRATEGIC REVIEW FAILURE: The Review identified issues but recommended Management Contract. Status quo maintenance has resulted in accelerating decline:

• Operational costs: +41% (2016/17 to 2023/24)
• Cancellations: 850 in single year (2023/24)
• Satisfaction: ~70 point decline (2009 to 2024)

FISCAL COMPARISON: 30-YEAR ANALYSIS

OPTION A: MAINTAIN FERRY (DfI DEFAULT)

Annual Costs (2023/24 baseline):

• Operating costs: £3.52m
• Income: £1.43m
• Net subsidy: £2.09m
• Capital/maintenance: ~£250k

30-Year Projection:

• Subsidy cost: £62.7m (assuming no cost escalation)
• Capital/major refits: £7.5m
• Total taxpayer cost: ~£70m
• Cost escalation risk: 41% increase over past 7 years suggests £80-90m realistic

Deliverables:

• Continued 07:45-22:30 service (9+ hours nightly gap)
• Ongoing weather vulnerability (108 fog cancellations/year)
• Aging fleet mechanical issues (158 mechanical cancellations/year)
• Industrial action risk (550 cancellations in 2023/24)
• 34% capacity utilization
• No revenue generation
• Escalating operational costs

OPTION B: BRIDGE WITH MIXED FUNDING

Capital Cost: £300-400m

Funding Sources:

• Shared Island Fund (50%): £150-200m
• Private finance (PPP): £100-150m
• NI Executive contribution: £50-100m

30-Year Revenue:

• Toll income (£2-2.50, growing traffic): £80-100m
• Development contributions: £10-15m
• Total revenue: £90-115m

30-Year Net Position:

• NI Executive capital: £50-100m
• Less toll revenue retained: £40-50m
• Net public sector cost: £0-60m
• Savings vs. ferry: £10-70m

Deliverables:

• 24/7 all-weather access
• 8-minute crossing (vs. 10 min + queue + wait)
• Zero operational cancellations
• 120-year asset life
• Revenue generation
• Strategic A2 corridor completion
• Economic development catalyst
• Healthcare emergency access
• Climate action contribution (eliminates diesel ferry)

COMPARATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

DEPARTMENTAL POSITION: SYSTEMATIC CONTRADICTIONS

1. “RELIABLE SERVICE” CLAIM

DfI Statement (Multiple sources):

“It provides a reliable service”

Contradictory Evidence:

• 2023/24: 848 cancellations
  • Industrial action: 550
  • Mechanical: 158
  • Fog: 108
  • Staff: 32
• Survey: 50.2% cite reliability as primary problem
• Survey: 71% cite mechanical reliability as most problematic
• Survey: 69.2% cite weather cancellations as most problematic

ASSESSMENT: Claim is empirically unsustainable

2. “MOST ECONOMICAL METHOD” CLAIM

DfI Statement:

“Currently the most economical method of providing an effective transportation link”

Contradictory Evidence:

• 30-year ferry cost: £70-90m taxpayer subsidy
• 30-year bridge cost: £0-60m net public cost (after Shared Island Fund + toll revenue)
• Potential savings: £10-70m
• Cost trajectory: +41% over 7 years
• Cost recovery: Only 41% (59% subsidized)

Missing Analysis:

• No whole-life cost comparison documented
• No alternative funding structures assessed
• No toll revenue potential modeled

ASSESSMENT: Claim not evidenced by comparative financial analysis

3. “INSUFFICIENT ECONOMIC BENEFITS” CLAIM

DfI Statement:

“There would currently be insufficient economic benefits to justify such a major investment”

Contradictory Evidence:

• Survey: 94.1% expect positive economic impact
• Regional context: Lowest wages (£450.10), second-lowest productivity
• Investment analysis: BCR 3.1:1 to 8.5:1
• Job creation potential: 10,000-18,000
• Suppressed demand: 91.5% would increase travel
• Toll revenue: £1.8m-5.25m annually

Missing Analysis:

• No economic impact assessment commissioned
• No BCR calculation using WebTAG methodology
• No wider economic benefits assessment
• No labor market expansion analysis
• No agglomeration benefits assessment
• No regional development impact assessment

ASSESSMENT: Claim not supported by economic analysis (because analysis not conducted)

4. “NOT GOOD USE OF PUBLIC FUNDING” FOR FEASIBILITY STUDY

DfI Statement:

“Taking forward a feasibility study is not considered a good use of public funding particularly during a time when the Department is facing significant funding and resource challenges”

Contradictory Evidence:

• Feasibility study cost: £100-200k (0.14-0.29% of 30-year ferry subsidy)
• Potential savings identification: £10-70m
• Risk reduction through evidence-based decision-making
• Shared Island Fund application requirement (could provide 50% capital)
• Standard infrastructure project development process

Comparative Scale:

• Ferry subsidy 2023/24: £2.09m
• Feasibility study: £100-200k = 4.8-9.6% of one year’s subsidy
• 30-year ferry cost: £70-90m
• Feasibility study: £100-200k = 0.1-0.3% of 30-year cost

ASSESSMENT: Refusal economically illogical given scale of long-term costs and potential savings

5. CIRCULAR LOGIC: “NO STUDY WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION; NO JUSTIFICATION WITHOUT STUDY”

DfI Position:

• Will not commission feasibility study due to “insufficient economic benefits”
• Economic benefits cannot be quantified without feasibility study
• Therefore: perpetual blockage

What Feasibility Study Would Establish:

1. Traffic demand modeling (including suppressed demand: 91.5% would increase travel)
2. Revenue projections (toll acceptance: 81.7%; willingness to pay £1-3: 74.5%)
3. Capital cost estimates (engineering design options)
4. Funding structure options (PPP, Shared Island Fund, NWF)
5. Economic impact assessment (BCR calculation)
6. Environmental impact scoping (SAC/ASSI mitigation)
7. Comparative whole-life costs (ferry vs. bridge)
8. Strategic alignment assessment (A2 corridor completion)

ASSESSMENT: DfI’s refusal to commission study that would provide evidence for decision-making represents institutional gatekeeping preventing evidence-based policy

POLITICAL CONSENSUS: UNPRECEDENTED CROSS-COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Cross-Party Political Support:

Jim Shannon MP (DUP) – Strangford:

• Expressed support for project
• Willing to accept Irish Government Shared Island Fund contribution
• Active constituent engagement

Chris Hazzard MP (Sinn Féin) – South Down:

• Publicly supportive
• Precedent of Shannon-Hazzard collaboration on Ballynahinch bypass

Michelle McIlveen MLA (DUP) – Strangford:

• Tabling Assembly Questions (AQW 27686/22-27, AQW 30608/22-27, AQW 30609/22-27, AQW 30610/22-27)
• Continuing advocacy with Infrastructure Minister
• Constituent correspondence

Alliance Party:

• Supportive

SDLP:

• Supportive

Jim Boylan (Narrow Water Bridge advocate):

• Endorsed SLC as complementary infrastructure

Electoral Context (Ards Peninsula DEA, 2023 Local Elections):

Results:

• DUP: 4 councillors elected
• Alliance: 1 councillor elected
• SDLP: 1 councillor elected
• Sinn Féin: Not elected (945 first preferences)

First Preference Votes (Ards Peninsula DEA):

• Democratic Unionist Party: 29.0%
• Alliance Party: 26.6%
• Ulster Unionist Party: 16.5%

CROSS-COMMUNITY INDICATOR: The project has achieved support across unionist-nationalist divide, demonstrated by:

• DUP MP endorsement (predominantly unionist constituency)
• Sinn Féin MP support
• Alliance Party support (cross-community party)
• SDLP support

ASSESSMENT: This level of cross-party, cross-community consensus on infrastructure is rare in Northern Ireland context and represents significant political capital for project delivery

IRISH GOVERNMENT POSITION

Department of the Taoiseach Response (DOT-TM25-11858-2025, 16 September 2025):

“A strategic capital investment proposal of this nature would, in the first instance, require exploration and progression with the relevant authorities in Northern Ireland. Any potential cross-border co-operation would be for consideration when a project proposal is progressed through relevant feasibility and development stages with the relevant Local Authority and Executive Department leads.”

SEQUENTIAL APPROACH IDENTIFIED:

1. Northern Ireland must act first: Feasibility study, business case development
2. Then: Irish Government cross-border cooperation consideration
3. Funding vehicle: Shared Island Fund (established precedent for cross-border infrastructure)

IRISH GOVERNMENT SIGNALS:

• Door remains open
• Conditional on Northern Ireland progressing through “feasibility and development stages”
• Shared Island Fund available for appropriate projects
• Precedent: Narrow Water Bridge project receiving Shared Island funding

BLOCKAGE: DfI refusal to commission feasibility study prevents progression to stage where Irish Government engagement becomes possible

ASSESSMENT: £150-200m potential Shared Island Fund contribution (50% of £300-400m capital) is inaccessible due to DfI’s refusal to take first step

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MINISTERS

Based on comprehensive analysis of survey data cross-referenced to official correspondence:

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS (0-3 MONTHS):

1. Commission Independent Feasibility Study (£100-200k)
   • Justification: 0.1-0.3% of 30-year ferry cost; essential for evidence-based decision
   • Scope: Traffic modeling (including suppressed demand), revenue projections, capital costs, funding options, economic impact assessment, environmental scoping
   • Independence: External consultants, not DfI internal assessment
2. Request Comparative 30-Year Analysis
   • Ferry operations whole-life cost (including cost escalation risk)
   • Bridge investment net public sector cost (after Shared Island Fund + toll revenue)
   • Risk-adjusted comparison
   • Include all WebTAG-compliant benefits (journey time, social value, wider economic impacts)
3. Engage Irish Government Regarding Shared Island Fund
   • Formal approach regarding feasibility study phase co-funding
   • Signal intent to progress through “feasibility and development stages”
   • Explore £150-200m capital contribution potential (50% of project)

SHORT-TERM ACTIONS (3-12 MONTHS):

4. Strategic Infrastructure Designation Decision
   • Evidence: Survey shows community priorities align with strategic needs (24/7 reliability, economic development, healthcare access)
   • Strategic fit: Completes A2 coastal route, addresses lowest-wage region, enables cross-border connectivity
   • Process: Include in Transport Strategy 2035 and Eastern Transport Plan as strategic project requiring assessment
5. Establish Cross-Departmental Working Group
   • DfI (Infrastructure delivery)
   • Department of Economy (Economic development, lowest-wage region)
   • Department of Finance (Funding structures, PPP expertise)
   • Department of Health (Healthcare access benefits, emergency services)
   • Liaison with Department of the Taoiseach (Shared Island Fund)
6. Formal Stakeholder Consultation
   • Evidence: 458 survey responses, 94% “not fit for purpose”, 90.6% prefer bridge, 87.1% expect quality of life improvement
   • Process: Formal public consultation to validate survey findings and inform project development
   • Stakeholders: Community, business sector, tourism sector, healthcare providers, education sector, environmental groups

MEDIUM-TERM ACTIONS (12-24 MONTHS):

7. Business Case Development (Subject to Feasibility Study Outcomes)
   • Full business case using Treasury Green Book / NI Guide to Expenditure Appraisal methodology
   • WebTAG-compliant transport economic assessment
   • Social value quantification
   • Environmental Impact Assessment scoping
   • Funding structure options appraisal
8. Shared Island Fund Application Preparation
   • Evidence: Irish Government door open conditional on NI progression
   • Potential: £150-200m (50% of capital cost)
   • Process: Formal application following feasibility study and business case completion
9. Environmental Impact Assessment Scoping
   • SAC/ASSI designation assessment
   • Modern engineering mitigation capabilities
   • Comparative environmental impact (ferry operations vs. bridge construction + operation)
   • Climate action contribution (decarbonization)
   • Renewable energy integration potential

CONCLUSION: EVIDENCE vs. POLICY POSITION

COMMUNITY EVIDENCE (458 Survey Responses):

• 62% dissatisfied with current ferry service
• 94% believe service “not fit for purpose”
• 90.6% prefer bridge as solution
• 81.7% willing to pay toll
• 91.5% would increase cross-lough travel
• 94.1% expect positive economic impact
• 87.1% expect quality of life improvement

DEPARTMENTAL POSITION:

• Ferry “provides a reliable service”
• Ferry “most economical method”
• “Insufficient economic benefits” for bridge
• Feasibility study “not good use of public funding”
• No plans to explore alternatives

FUNDAMENTAL DISCONNECT:

The survey evidence reveals a systematic and comprehensive rejection by the community of DfI’s position that the ferry is adequate and alternatives unjustified.

Every major DfI claim is contradicted by survey data:

CRITICAL EVIDENCE GAPS:

DfI has made definitive conclusions without conducting the analyses required to support those conclusions:

1. No suppressed demand modeling (despite 91.5% would increase travel)
2. No toll revenue assessment (despite 81.7% willing to pay)
3. No journey time benefit quantification (despite 67.6% estimate 20+ minutes savings)
4. No quality of life valuation (despite 87.1% expect improvement)
5. No regional economic development assessment (despite lowest wages, second-lowest productivity region)
6. No comparative whole-life cost analysis (ferry vs. bridge)
7. No funding structure options assessment (PPP, Shared Island Fund, NWF)
8. No environmental comparative assessment (ferry emissions vs. bridge)

INSTITUTIONAL GATEKEEPING:

DfI’s position represents circular logic preventing evidence-based policy:

• Won’t study alternatives because “insufficient benefits”
• Can’t quantify benefits without study
• Therefore: perpetual blockage regardless of evidence

This is not evidence-based policymaking; it is evidence-prevented policymaking.

FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY PARADOX:

DfI refuses £100-200k feasibility study while committing to:

• £70-90m in ferry subsidies over 30 years
• Escalating operational costs (+41% over 7 years)
• Aging fleet mechanical failures (158 cancellations/year)
• Service gaps leaving no emergency access 9+ hours nightly
• 34% capacity utilization indicating massive inefficiency

Meanwhile:

• Potential Shared Island Fund contribution: £150-200m (inaccessible without feasibility study)
• Potential toll revenue: £80-100m over 30 years (not modeled)
• Potential taxpayer savings: £10-70m vs. ferry option (not assessed)

THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION FOR MINISTERS:

Given:

• Community consensus: 94% believe service “not fit for purpose”, 90.6% prefer bridge
• Political consensus: Unprecedented cross-party support (DUP, Sinn Féin, Alliance, SDLP)
• Economic need: Lowest wages, second-lowest productivity region in NI
• Fiscal opportunity: £150-200m Shared Island Fund potential + toll revenue
• Service failure: 62% dissatisfied, 850 cancellations/year, 15-year satisfaction decline
• Evidence gaps: All major benefit streams unquantified by DfI

Why is a £100-200k feasibility study (0.1% of 30-year costs) being refused?

The survey evidence demonstrates this is not a technical or economic question—it is a policy choice to maintain status quo despite comprehensive evidence of failure and community consensus for change.

Ministers must decide:

• Continue £70-90m subsidy for failing service (DfI default)
• Invest £100-200k to establish evidence base for transformational alternative with potential £10-70m taxpayer savings

The community has provided the evidence. The question is whether policy will follow the evidence or ignore it.